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....the final proof of God's omnipotence [is]  that he need
not exist in order to save us.
Peter DeVries, The Mackerel Plaza                                   
Is it just me, or do philosophers have a way of bringing existence
in where it is not wanted?  All of the most popular analyses, it seems,
take notions that are not overtly existence-involving and connect them
up with notions that are existence-involving up to their teeth.  An
inference is valid or invalid according to whether or not there exists a
countermodel to it; the Fs are equinumerous with the Gs iff there exists a
one-to-one function between them; it will rain iff there exists a future
time at which it does rain; and, of course, such and such is possible iff
there exists a world at which such and such is the case.
The problem with these analyses is not just the unwelcome
ontology; it is more the ontology's intuitive irrelevance to the notions
being analyzed.  Even someone not especially opposed to functions, to
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take that example, is still liable to feel uneasy about putting facts of
equinumerosity at their mercy.  For various awkward questions arise, of
which let me mention three.
How is it that I can tell that my left shoes are equal in number with
my right ones just by pairing them off, while the story of how I am
supposed to be able to ascertain the existence of abstract objects like
functions remains to be told?1  Lacking that story,  who am I to say that
equinumerosity facts even correlate with facts of functional existence --
much less that the correlation rises to the level of an analysis?
If my left shoes' numerical equality with my right turns on the
existence of functions, then in asserting this equality I am giving a
hostage to existential fortune; I speak truly only if the existence facts
break my way.2  But that is not how it feels.  Am I really to suppose that
God can cancel my shoes' equinumerosity (and so make a liar out of me)
simply by training his or her death gun on the offending functions,
without laying a hand on the shoes themselves?
Assuming that a one-to-one function between my left and right
shoes exists at all, there are going to be lots of them.  But then,
rather than saying that my left and right shoes are equal in number
because these various functions exist, wouldn't it be better to say
that the functions exist -- are able to exist, anyway -- because my left
and right shoes are equal in number?  That way we explain the
many facts in terms of the one, rather than the one in terms of the
many.
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All of the analyses mentioned have problems like this. And the
reply is the same in each case: The reason these analyses are so
popular is that they do crucial theoretical work. If you know of
another way of accomplishing this work,  terrific; otherwise, though,
spare us the handwringing about existence coming in where it is not
wanted.  This paper explores a strategy, only that, for getting the
work done without getting mucked up in irrelevant existence
questions.
I
A funny thing happened on the way to the possible-worlds analysis
of modality.  Or actually, two funny things, of which only the first
attracted any notice.  The first is David Lewis's well-known "paraphrase"
argument for belief in worlds:
I believe...that things could have been different in countless ways...Ordinary
language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have
been besides the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence... says
that there exist many entities of a certain description, to wit 'ways things
could have been'... I believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; ...I
therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called 'ways
things could have been'.  I prefer to call them 'possible worlds.' 3
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If someone wants to know what sort of thing these worlds are,
I can only ask him to admit that he knows what sort of thing our actual world
is, and then explain that other worlds are more things of that sort, differing         
not in kind but only in what goes on at them.4     
So, other worlds (of the same general sort as our actual world) exist
because there are other ways things could have been; and other ways
things could have been exist because things could have been different
from the way they are in actual fact.
Now, everyone knows there is something funny about this
argument of Lewis's,  because Stalnaker has told them:
If possible worlds are ways things might have been, then the actual world
ought to be the way things are rather than I and all my surroundings                                .  The                                                        
way things are is a property or state of the world, not the world itself. The                         
statement that the world is the way it is is true in a sense, but not when read
as an identity statement... One could accept...that there really are many ways
that things could have been...while denying that there exists anything else
that is like the actual world.5
The second funny thing is this explanation of Stalnaker's. If it hasn't
struck people that way, that's because Stalnaker has packed two quite
different points very closely together.
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Stalnaker's negative point is that while the paraphrase argument
may establish something, it does not establish the existence of Lewis-
worlds  -- that is,  (i) concrete, I-and-all-my-surroundings, worlds,  which
unlike this one are (ii) worlds that do not actually exist.  All the
argument gets you is "ways things could have been,"  and ways things
could have been meet neither condition -- not (i), because ways of being
are not to be confused with the things that are those ways, and not (ii),
because if we ask, "Are there actually other ways things could have been
or is it just that there could have been?" the answer is that there actually
are these other ways.6
What's so funny about that?  Wait, I haven't got to the funny part.
That's the part where Stalnaker turns his critique of Lewis's reading of
"ways things could have been" into a positive proposal of his own.
Think of Stalnaker as arguing like this: Ways the world could have
been are of the same ontological type as the way it is.  So we need to
determine the ontological type of the way the world is.  What better
place to start than with the truism that the world is the way it is?  Some
might read this as saying that the way the world is is one and the same
entity as the humongous concrete object known hereabouts as the world.
That, however, would be a mistake:  "The statement that the world is the
way it is is true in a sense, but not when read as an identity statement."7
But, if the statement is false read as an identity statement, what is the
reading on which it is true?  Stalnaker doesn't come right out and tell us,
but the usual alternative to an "is" of identity is an "is" of predication.
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Apparently then Stalnaker is saying that the statement is true when the
"is" is taken as predicative.
This is what I find funny, or at least puzzling. Because the phrase
following the "is," namely "the way it is," looks less like a predicate than
a singular term.  And Stalnaker uses it a singular term, when he says
that "the way things are is a property or state of the world," and that
"the way the world is could exist even if a world that is that way did
not."8  But, looking at the matter naively, when you've got an "is"
between two singular terms, the "is" is not an "is" of predication but one
of identity.9  Which is just what Stalnaker denies.
  Of course, if "the way the world is" stands for a property, then
there is a true predication in the vicinity: one ought to be able to say
that the world has this property. But "the world has the way it is" sounds
quite wrong. Why, if "the way the world is" denotes a property that the
world as a matter of fact possesses?
I I
What are we to make of this phrase "the way the world is"?
According to Stalnaker, it does not stand for me and all my
surroundings. But it does not appear to stand for a property of me and
my surroundings either. What then?10
- 7 -
The strategy that suggests itself is this.  Take the matrix "the way
the world is is X," plug in a term that makes for a true sentence, and ask
what the term stands for.  That ought to be what "the way the world is"
stands for as well.  When we try to carry this strategy out, though, we
run into an unexpected problem;  the matrix doesn't want a term, it
wants adjectives:
The way the world is is large, complicated, law-governed, mostly 
uninhabited, shot through with force fields, bathed in radiation, etc.
And now things get really confusing. There is no way on earth of
interpreting the main "is" in this sentence as an "is" of identity. And yet,
if we interpret it as an "is" of predication, we are back with Lewis's
concrete worlds -- for the thing that is large, complicated, bathed in
radiation, law-governed, etc., is not a property of me and my
surroundings but, well, me and my surroundings.
Here is our puzzle.   "The way the world is," "the way it would have
been if so and so had happened," "the ways it could have been" -- these
look for all the world like noun phrases.  It stands to reason then that
they at least purport to denote entities of some sort.  What sort?  This is
a puzzle whether you believe in the purported entities or not. Indeed,
you don't know whether to believe in them until you solve the puzzle --
until you figure out what the entities are whose existence is in question.
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I I I
Suppose we start by beating some neighboring bushes. Ways the
world could have been are hardly the only ways countenanced by
ordinary speech. Just from the song "The Way You Do the Things You
Do" you could gather a respectable collection.11   But let's have some
more humdrum examples: the ways people feel on various occasions
(sleepy, happy, jealous, relieved, like a motherless child), the ways birds
have of building their nests, the ways of getting from point A to point B,
and so on.
Now, what kind of entity am I talking about in talking about these
various ways?  Take the way I felt when I got up this morning, viz.,
sleepy;  or the way cockatoos build their nests, from the outside in;12  or
the fastest way of getting from Toronto to Lima,  that is,  via
Tegucigalpa.  What are these things?
If you are anything like me, the tempting reply is: What  things?  It
is hard to think of the phrases "sleepy," "from the outside in," "via
Tegucigalpa" as standing for entities at all; their function just does not
seem to be referential.
Someone might want to write this off to a lack of imagination.
"Sleepy" denotes a state of mind, namely, sleepiness; "from the outside
in" stands for a property of nest-building events, the property of
centripetality; "via Tegucigalpa" stands for a path or set of paths or
property of paths through space-time.
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But if sleepiness, happiness, relief, and so on are the entities
collectively denoted by "ways of feeling," then it is strange, isn't it, that
one can't say "ways of feeling, for example,..." and then plug in names of
these entities.  Why  is it "ways of feeling, for example, sleepy, happy,
relieved, like a motherless child,..."  rather than "ways of feeling, for
example, sleepiness, happiness, relief, similarity to a motherless child,
..."?   Again, if sleepiness and so on are among the entities that are called
"ways of feeling," then it ought to make sense to say "sleepiness is the
way I felt this morning" and "nobody knows the way I feel: similarity to
a motherless child." And it doesn't. What makes sense is "sleepy is the
way I felt."  And sleepy doesn't seem to be an entity at all, not even an
entity of a highly abstract sort.
I V
What is going on?  A first clue to the peculiar behavior of "way" is
that "the way I feel" sounds rather like "how I feel."13  This is no
coincidence;  "the way" lines up with "how" over a wide range of cases:
 (1)    the way you put it just now /  how you put it just now
the way things work around here / how things work around here
the way they met / how they met
the way she wants to be remembered / how she wants to be remembered
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On the right-hand side of (1) we have what grammarians call indirect
questions. I can't give you an exact definition (I'm not sure anyone
could)  but intuitively, indirect questions are noun-like counterparts to
ordinary or direct questions:
 (2) how things work around here / how do things work around here?
what the coach forgot / what did the coach forget?
why he's acting like that / why is he acting like that?
when the swallows return / when do the swallows return?
who invited them / who invited them?
whether it will rain / will it rain ?
where she is headed / where is she headed?
whether it will rain / will it rain ?
The problem we have been wrestling with is, in effect:  Are indirect
questions referential or is their semantical contribution to be sought
elsewhere?14
Now in asking, "Are they referential?" I mean not, "Are there
Montague grammarians or other formal semanticists somewhere who
have cooked up super-duper semantical values for them, say, functions
from worlds to functions from worlds and n-tuples of objects to truth-
values?"15  The answer to that is going to be yes almost no matter what
part of speech you're talking about -- connectives, prepositions, and
apostrophe-"s" not excluded.  I mean: Are they referential in the way
that singular terms are, so that someone using an indirect question
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could reasonably be said to be talking about its referent, or purporting
to talk about its purported referent?
Are indirect questions referential in that sense?   Truth be told,
some of them seem at first to be; because some of them seem linkable by
true identity statement with phrases whose referential status is beyond
question. Here are some examples:
 (3) what the coach forgot was the keys, the map, and the schedule
March 31 is when the swallows return
who invited them is your friend Becky
Albuquerque is where she's going16
Taking the "is" in these statements to express identity -- and what other
option have we, really, with noun phrases on either side?  -- "who invited
them" stands for Becky, "where she's going" stands for Albuquerque,
and so on.
And yet, there can be very similar-looking statements where the
identity interpretation is unavailable.  Newt Gingrich recently had to
explain to the mainland Chinese that he hadn't meant it about extending
recognition to Taiwan,  he was "only trying to rattle their cage."  Taking
him at his word, why Gingrich talks like that is to rattle their cage. Or
suppose that pharmacologists studying the effects of tranquilizers on the
brain determine that the way valium soothes our ruffled feelings is by
blocking the action of a certain neurotransmitter.  Well and good. But,
does anyone really take statements like
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(4) why he talks like that is to rattle their cage
how valium soothes is by blocking that neurotransmitter
why we hesitated was out of concern for you
how I want to feel is happy
to assert literal identities?  I hope not, because on the face of it there's
no such thing as to rattle their cage or out of concern for you or happy
to be identical to.  And this raises doubts about the referential
interpretation of the examples in (3) as well.  The "is" of "how valium
soothes is by blocking that neurotransmitter" seems indistinguishable
from the "is" of "who valium soothes is the people who take it."  If it
expresses identity in the one case, it ought to do so in the other.
Now, of course, the referentialist can simply insist that the two
"is"s are different;  the one in (3) expresses identity, the one in (4)
expresses predication.  This would be just as good from her point of view
since,  predicative "is" functioning to bring the referent of the phrase it
follows under the descriptive content of the phrase it precedes,  "why he
acts like that" etc. would again be cast in a referential light.
But the predicative interpretation is hard to make out.  The best
way to see this is to allow the referentialist her contention that the
phrases on the left hand side of (4) are referential.  Say, in other words,
that an entity how I want to feel exists.  Is this entity characterized as
happy by the sentence "how I want to feel is happy"?   Clearly not.  No
one is saying that a full accounting of the happy things would include
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(in addition to Dale Carnegie and Barney the dinosaur and your typical
sea otter)  how I want to feel.  The claim is rather that if you are asking
me how I want to feel, the answer is that I want to feel happy.
With the other examples, matters are even worse.  "X is happy" at
least has the right form to describe X.  But what property or
characteristic is attributed to X by "X is to rattle their cage," "X is by
blocking that neurotransmitter," or "X is out of concern for you"?
Someone might say that "X is to rattle their cage" describes X as being
done for the purpose of rattling their cage.  But then the problem is the
same as before:  being done for such and such a purpose is a
characteristic not of why people perform actions (!?!) but of the actions
they perform.
Actually, to the extent that the identity-predication distinction
finds a foothold in (4) at all, it may be doubted whether the advantage
lies with the predicative approach. What was it that the pharmacologists
told us?  Not that blocking that neurotransmitter is an aspect or feature
of how valium soothes; according to them, it is how valium soothes.  And
you can almost hear Gingrich at the press conference: "You people just
don't get it, to rattle their cage is why I made those statements, there's
no difference between the two."  Pressed from the other side by the
predicative interpretation, one almost wants to say that there's an
identity here. There isn't, of course,  but the feeling of identity is a
fascinating datum and one that needs to be taken seriously.17
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But the case against referentialism needn't be made to rest on
these subtleties about predication versus identity.  Take "who invited
them," as in "who invited them is your friend Becky."  If this referred to
Becky, we would expect it to be intersubstitutable salva veritate with
other phrases referring to Becky -- phrases like "Becky."  What we find
though is that the two are not even substitutable salva congruitate.18
This is illustrated by
 (5) I wonder where Becky has gone / *I wonder where who invited them has gone
Becky was accepted at Yale / *Who invited them was accepted at Yale
and, the reverse substitution,
 (6) I wonder who invited them / *I wonder Becky.
It doesn't matter who invited them / *It doesn't matter Becky.
These examples point up a final difficulty with the referential approach.
Even if "who invited them" did refer to Becky, that would explain only a
tiny fraction of its semantical behavior. Kartunnen in "Syntax and
Semantics of Questions" offers the following overview of indirect-
question-embedding contexts:19
 (7) VERBS OF
acquiring knowledge: ask, wonder, learn, notice, discover
retaining knowledge: know, be aware, recall, forget
 communication: tell, show, indicate, inform, disclose
decision: decide, determine, specify, agree on, control
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conjecture: guess, predict, bet on, estimate
opinion:  be certain about, have an idea about
relevance: matter, care, be important,  be significant
dependency: depend on, be related to, be a function of
"Who invited them" can occur in almost all of these contexts, yet its
semantic contribution is purely referential in none of them.20 Shouldn't
we look for an explanation of the other-than-referential work done by
indirect questions, before we go ahead and assign them referents?  That
explanation might turn out to apply across the board.
V
Indirect questions are indirect questions;  that is the point we keep
on losing sight of.  Since they are questions it would not be surprising if
their interpretation went via the items that normally go by that name,
viz.  direct questions.  Here is a crude first proposal, using Q for the
direct question corresponding to an indirect question IQ:
 To say that ---IQ--- is to offer information about Q's answer(s).21
This deliberately leaves a lot to the imagination.   Among the issues I
propose to duck, or settle in whatever way seems most convenient at the
time,  are these:
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 What kind of information?  Is the information determined by the sentential
context (---...---)  alone or do other factors contribute?  What are the
mechanisms by which these factors operate?
Are answers linguistic in nature or do linguistic items function rather as
presentations of the real, extralinguistic, answers?
Are answers one and all sentence-length, as you would think from the fact
that we call them true and false, or not, as you would think from the fact that
"5" (or perhaps 5) is the answer to "what is 2 plus 3?"
Does each question have a unique complete and correct answer or do some
have multiple answers with these features?
All that we need to assume for now is that to each direct Q corresponds
a unique complete and correct answer-set AQ;  there is no official line on
how many answers AQ contains or what sorts of entities these answers
are.22
Statements embedding indirect questions IQ are in the business of
offering information about Q's answer or answers -- about AQ.23  One
move in this direction stands out as particularly natural;  we might seek
to provide AQ outright.  The natural way to proceed if that is our goal is
to say simply that IQ is AQ:
 (8) what the coach forgot was the keys, the map, etc.
who invited them is Becky
- 17 -
why Gingrich talks like that is to rattle their cage
how valium soothes is by blocking that neurotransmitter
why we hesitated was out of concern for you.
how I want to feel is happy
Notice again the equational, identity-like, feeling of these statements. A
tempting explanation is that in each case we have an identity in the
vicinity: "Becky" is (in the identity sense) the answer to "who invited
them?," "to rattle their cage" is the answer to "why does he act like
that?," and so on.24  As for the identity-feeling's curious insensitivity to
the grammatical category of the phrase following the "is" -- that "happy"
is an adjective does not make "how I want to feel is happy" feel any less
identity-like -- this is only to be expected if the underlying identity is
between "happy" and the answer to "how do I want to feel?" rather than
(?!?) happy and how I want to feel.
Another puzzle left over from the last section is this. Why is it that
some indirect questions, like "who invited them," seem at first glance
referential while others, like "how valium works," do not?  The
equational flavor of "IQ is AQ" suggests a two-part explanation. First,
some AQs ("Becky") are referential; others ("via Tegucigalpa")  are not.25
Second, the "is" of "IQ is AQ" acts as a pipeline transmitting felt
referential character from the one side to the other. This leads to the
prediction that IQ should strike us as prima facie referential when
(i) "IQ is AQ" makes sense;
           (ii) AQ is referential.26
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Is the prediction borne out?  Indirect who-,  where-, and when- questions
typically satisfy both conditions,  so we would expect them to give the
impression of referring.27 And for the most part they do: "who invited
them" appears to refer to Becky, "where she's headed" to Albuquerque,
and so on.
Indirect how- and why-questions satisfy (i) but not (ii); "how I feel
is happy" and "why he talks like that is to rattle their cage"  both scan
but their right-hand sides do not refer. So the prediction is that they will
not feel referential, and this again seems true.
Indirect which-questions are a mixed bag, but what often happens
is that they satisfy (ii) but not (i). The answer to "which door do you
pick?," for example,  might be "door number three," a perfectly good
referring phrase.  But "which door you pick is door number three"
doesn't scan.  The prediction then is that "which door you pick" will not
strike us as a referring phrase.  (The reason is not inherent
ungrammaticality, since "which door you pick is up to you" sounds
fine.)
Indirect whether-questions feel highly nonreferential,  finally, as a
result of satisfying neither (i) nor (ii).  Not only are their AQs lacking in
reference, they cannot be plugged into sensical "IQ is AQ" statements:
witness "whether you are still grounded is yes."
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Before getting back to possible worlds, consider one last puzzle
from the previous section.  If the point and purpose of indirect
questions is to refer, then what are we to make of
 (9) I wonder who invited them
it doesn't matter who invited them
who invited them is none of your business
where guests sit is a function of who invited them?
Read these statements as commenting on the answers to their embedded
questions,28 and all becomes clear.  Something is said not to matter by
"it doesn't matter who invited them," but it is not Becky, it is the answer
to "who invited them?"  "Where guests sit is a function of who invited
them" does not assign seating authority to any particular person, it says
that the answer to "where shall X sit?" depends on the answer to "who
invited X?"29
V I
Assuming that something like this approach to indirect questions is
correct, what does it tell us about the possible-worlds account of
modality?
Here is the answer you probably expect:  It upsets Lewis’s
paraphrase argument according to which we are committed to worlds in
being committed to ways things could have been. The argument doesn't
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hold up, because each and every way things could have been is a how
things could have been.  And the phrase "how things could have been" is
an indirect question with zero referential import.
I see three connected problems with this answer.  The first is
hinted at by the awkwardness of what I just said: "each and every way
things could have been is a how things could have been."  A how things
could have been?  What on earth is that?   "How things are" is available
as the translation of "the way things are,"  and "how things would have
been" is available as the translation of "the way things would have
been."  But nothing along these lines is available for "some/all of the
ways things could have been," because hows are not things the language
countenances.30  If the idea was to translate world-talk into way-talk, and
way-talk into how-talk, and how-talk into answer-talk, then the idea
doesn't work, because quantificational way-talk doesn't translate.
Now for the second problem, which has to do with our emphasis
throughout on the irreferentiality of indirect questions. Isn't this missing
the point of the paraphrase argument?  Lewis's concern is with
ontological commitment.  And as Quine thought he had made
sufficiently clear about half a century ago,31 one makes little progress on
matters of ontological commitment by staring at controversial chunks of
language waiting for them to yield up the secret of whether they are
really referential or not.32  (You know what they say about a watched
mot.)   The true and proper test of ontological commitment is
quantification into the position a given chunk of language occupies.
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That is why Lewis argues from the fact, not that ordinary language refers
to ways, but that ordinary language quantifies over ways.
Third, the paraphrase argument was never the important one in
the first place. The important argument has always been that possible
worlds are too useful to be done without. Lewis is crystal clear about
this:
Why believe in a plurality of worlds? -- Because the hypothesis is
serviceable, and that is a reason to think that it is true.33    
"Even those who officially scoff," he adds, "often cannot resist the
temptation to help themselves abashedly to this useful way of
speaking."34  And to repeat, this is a way of speaking that is up to its
neck in ontologically committal quantification.
Wrapping all of this up into a single point: if your one
ontologically deflating move concerns indirect questions, and if the real
measure of ontological commitment is not these but quantification into
the spots they occupy, and if quantification into the spots that they
occupy is practically speaking unavoidable, then you really haven't gone
very far towards diminishing commitment to possible worlds.35
- 22 -
VI I
Hold on, though. Because "the way that such and such"
translates into "how such and such," one naturally supposes that
"some/all of the ways that such and such" has got to translate into
"some/all of the hows such and such" -- which of course it can't,
because "hows" makes no sense.  But this is to insinuate a problem
about plurals into what was supposed to be a problem about
quantification.
Imagine someone arguing as follows: "the reason I did it"
translates into "why I did it," but no analogous translation is possible
for "some/all of the reasons I did it," because whys are not things the
language countenances.  Similarly, we have "when the swallows
return," "where your story breaks down," and "what really gets my
goat," but not "some/all of the whens they return,"  "some/all of the
wheres your story breaks down,"  or "some/all of the whats that get
my goat."  There is no grammatical alternative, it seems, to objectual
quantification over reasons, times, narrative breakdown points, and
whatever sort of thingum it is that gets people's goats.
 What this argument overlooks is that one doesn't need
pluralizations of "why" (etc.) to carry out why-quantification (etc.);
that's what words like "whyever," "never," "always," "somewhere," and
"whatever" are for.  And why shouldn't we say the same about "how"?
"Some/all of the hows" may not make sense, but it doesn't have to, for
we have "somehow" and "however":36
- 23 -
(10) if Valium works how you say, then Librium works similarly
variables: if Valium works thusly, then Librium works like so                          
existential: if Valium works somehow, then Librium too works somehow                                    
universal: however Valium works, so                 also works Librium.37    
Of course, the embrace of colloquial how- (why-, what-, which-,...)
quantifiers gains us nothing unless they share in the freedom from
ontological commitment we saw with the corresponding indirect
questions.  But intuitively they do.  "He blew the house down by
huffing and puffing" is a strictly stronger statement than "he blew it
down somehow."  But it would not be stronger if the "somehow"
carried a commitment to, say, ways,  for "by huffing and puffing" is
not committal in anybody's book.
VIII
All of that having been said, let me be the first to admit that
colloquial how-quantification is a pretty clumsy semantical instrument
compared to objectual quantification over ways.  Anyone who doubts
this is invited to try to render "there is more than one way to skin a
cat," or "there are more ways of skinning a cat than of falling off a
log," or "not many ways of falling off a log are in addition ways of
skinning a cat" in the austere idiom of "somehow," "nohow," and
"however."   One could try to meet these expressive difficulties head
on by concocting ever fancier how-quantifiers ("cats can be skinned
- 24 -
doublehow," "skinning a cat is howlier than falling off a log,"....).38
But as a practical matter there seems little real alternative to
quantifying directly over ways,  or some approximation to ways.
Another reason why "somehow" and "however" are no automatic
panacea is that all quantifiers, even the most seemingly nonobjectual,
are caught up in a powerful objectual undertow that threatens to
obliterate the distinction here at issue.  Talk about objects has a
surface clarity and tractability that entrances not just ordinary folk
trying to convey meanings ("and another thing you've got to learn is
how to stick up for yourself") but also philosophers trying to explain
them.39   Things have reached the point that someone giving the
"semantics" of a construction is expected to tell a story about which
entities have to behave in which ways for the sentences that include it
to come out true. Nothing less will do, it is felt, if the construction's
meaning is to be made fully intelligible.40
The third point is that such a story is not out of the question in
this case.  Quantified uses of "how" have, it appears, a similar
semantical function to indirect interrogative uses.  Both facilitate
commentary on the answers to how-questions, indirect "how" by
invoking the answers, quantified "how" by generalizing over them.
"Life after death is possible somehow" says more or less that "how is
life after death possible?" has a correct answer. "However you want to
do it is fine with me" says that if "like so" is a correct answer to "how
do you want to do it?,"  then doing it like so is fine with me.   Of
course, "somehow" and "however" are not the only nonobjectual
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quantifiers built around other question-words; there are also
whichever, somewhere, whyever, however many, etc.  All of these
plausibly have a similar function, the function of enabling
generalization over answers to questions of the indicated types.
I X
Now you see the predicament.  Nonobjectual quantifiers, let
them be as seriously intended as you like,  are not committal.  But
neither are they primitive,  and our best bet about how to explicate
them is in terms of quantifiers that are (when seriously intended)
committal.
I see only one way out.  If a construction that is not committal-
when-serious is to be explained by a construction that is, then the
second construction had better be treated for purposes of the
explanation as nonserious or feigned.41   Someone who says that the
treasure is buried somewhere is saying that "where is it buried?" has
an answer, bracketing any and all worries about the existence of
entities suited to serve answers  -- stipulating, if you like, in a spirit of
make-believe, that questions that "have answers" in the weak sense of
not being unanswerable have them in a stronger (more ontologically
loaded) sense as well.42
If this seems to leave the shape of the make-believe somewhat
open, that is intentional.  Its shape will vary depending on our
conception of answers: of what they are in general (linguistic items or
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what linguistic so-called "answers"  stand for?) and the (grammatical
or ontological) form that they take in connection with specific sorts of
questions.43   The main thing that needs to be imagined on the
linguistic conception of answers is that enough of them exist;
questions do not go unanswered just through someone's failure to put,
say, "by huffing and puffing" into words.
But suppose that linguistic so-called "answers"  are instead
answer-formulations; the real answers are the worldly entities to
which they refer, and other entities of the same sort.  Then there are
two cases, according to whether the linguistic so-called "answers" are
of the right grammatical form to refer.  If they are, then our main
imaginative task is to supply each of them with referents; there will
have to be such a thing as the Easter Bunny to serve as the answer to
"who does Isaac expect to see at the mall?"  Otherwise it will have to
be imagined that they are in the business of referring -- to entities
drawn from the ranks of some real or concocted ontological category.
(This paper does not advocate any particular account of ways, but one
could do worse than the following: ways are the things we imagine
ourselves referring to to by use of phrases like "by huffing and
puffing," when we imagine that phrases like that can be used to refer.)
X
But  we are getting ahead of ourselves.  It is time to put make-
believe to the side for a while and return to the original objection: "If
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the idea is to translate world-talk into way-talk, and way-talk into
how-talk, and how-talk into answer-talk, then the idea doesn't work,
because quantificational way-talk doesn't translate."  Our reply is that
it does translate, into colloquial how-quantification, and that
colloquial how-quantification translates in turn into (feigned, but we
are putting that aside for now) objectual quantification over answers
to how-questions.   That the middleman here has its expressive limits
is not a problem, for we can cut the middleman out and read apparent
quantification over ways directly into objectual quantification over
answers.
Take for instance Lewis's statement that "there are many ways
things could have been besides the way they actually are."   This says
that "how could things have been?" has many incompatible answers that
do not correctly answer "how are things as a matter of fact?"
Next try "there is a way things could have been such that blue
swans existed."  One interpretation is that "how could things have
been?" has an answer according to which there are blue swans. But this
might give the impression of a two-stage process in which we first collect
answers to "how could things have been?" at random, only then
considering whether we have hit on anything favorable to the blue swan
hypothesis.  A better interpretation homes in on the scenarios we are
actually interested in:  "how could it have been that there were blue
swans?" has an answer, full stop.44
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X I
Anyone who does modal metaphysics at all has got to feel some
attraction to the formula: S is possible iff there is a way things could
have been such that S.  To go by what was just said about quantification
over ways,  the formula means something like this:
   (11)  ◊S  iff H◊S? has a correct answer,
("H◊S?" is short for "how could it have been that S?")  (11) invites
comparison with the reading enshrined in standard possible worlds
semantics: S is possible iff there is at least one S-world, an abstract sort
of world in Stalnaker's version of the semantics
   (12) ◊S  iff  there is an abstract world according to which S,
a concrete sort in Lewis's version
   (13) ◊S  iff  there is a concrete world at which S.
Not surprisingly given their shared intuitive origins, the three
approaches agree in linking possibility to the existence of an appropriate
witness.  (If necessity is the dual of possibility, they agree too in linking
S's necessity to the nonexistence of witnesses to the possibility of not-S.)
But notice a crucial difference between them.  (12) and (13) we believe,
or try to believe, because we are so impressed by the theoretical work
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they do. (11) on the other hand comes close to being a conceptual truth
about possibility.
How is that?  (11)'s right-to-left direction says that S is possible
provided that "how is S possible?" has a correct answer. Assuming that a
correct answer to "how is S possible?" will be a truth of the form "S+ is
possible,"  where S+ has S as a consequence,  this amounts to the claim
that
   (11') ◊S if ◊S+ --  where S+ is sufficient for S.
And on any halfway natural reading of "sufficient,"  it is true as a
conceptual matter that if something sufficient for S is possible, then S is
possible as well.45
Now consider the direction from left to right: S is possible only if
"how is S possible?" has an answer.  This forces us to speculate a little on
the kind of S+ the questioner is looking for.  I hear her as issuing a
challenge:
You think that S is possible but I suspect that this is only because
you have neglected the matter of T. I therefore ask you: is S
possible in the T way, or is it possible in the not-T way?  According
to you, for instance,  there can be a town whose barber shaves all
and only the town's non-self-shavers. But are we to think of this
barber as shaving himself, or as not shaving himself?
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Understood like this,  the question "how is S possible?" has an answer iff
it is possible that S&T, or else possible that S&¬T.46 Since there is no way
of telling in advance what unresolved issue T might have attracted the
questioner's attention, we arrive at the claim that, pick any T you like,
   (11") ◊S only if ◊S+1 or ◊S+2 -- where S+1 = S&T and S+2 = S&¬T.
This says that possibility is expansive:  nothing is possible which cannot
be expanded into a more inclusive possibility, inclusiveness being
judged along any dimension you like.47 To come at it from the other
side, there can be no refuge from impossibility in refusing to take a
stand on matters left open; if an impossibility would result however
these matters were decided, you've got an impossibility already.48
Either way, expansiveness looks like a conceptual truth.
XI I
Voila!  possible world semantics without possible worlds. Because
what we have in (11) is a structural analogue of Lewis's (13) in which
worlds do not figure49  --  an analogue, moreover, with some claim to be
regarded as analytic.  But I can imagine various questions and
objections, starting with the objection that since (11) is circular -- modal
notions appear on its right-hand side -- it fails to provide a reductive
analysis of modality.
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There is no denying the circularity.  "S+ is possible" does not count
as a correct answer to "how is S possible?" unless it is true, which means
that S+ has got to really be possible.50  But why exactly is this an
objection?   To reply that (11) is up against (13), which being
noncircular can function as an analysis, just pushes the question back a
step. Why should the potential for functioning as an analysis count so
heavily in (13)'s favor?
The answer may seem obvious from something already mentioned,
that the argument for (13) is in terms of the theoretical services it offers.
Lewis offers an impressive catalogue of these services in his book The
Plurality of Worlds;  here we will have to limit ourselves to a single
example.   How, without an analysis like (13), are we to understand why
this, that, and the other should be the laws of modality?   True enough,
it can be proved in pure mathematics that
if modal operators can be correctly analysed in so-and-so way [as quantifiers   
over worlds], then they obey so-and-so systems of modal logic.51          
This conditional gets us nowhere, however, unless we are in a position to
discharge the antecedent.  And to get ourselves into that position, we
need to count an analysis like (13) into our belief system.
But although this is often said, it is hard to see how the application
depends on (13)'s constituting an analysis.  As long as (13) is true (the
left-hand side holds just when the right one does) and known to be, the
deduction of modal laws from the laws of quantification would appear to
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go through just the same. And now we begin to lose our grip on where
the insistence on a reductive correlation is coming from.  If the choice of
a correlation is to be driven by considerations of theoretical utility
alone, nothing should matter but that
(a) the correlation is there,
     (b) it is comprehensive,
(c) it is not itself unduly mysterious, and
     (d) it can be used to dispel other mysteries.
And, to twist around a famous remark of Lewis's, it is not clear why a
nonreductive correlation must have trouble with these conditions --
unless you beg the question by saying that it already is trouble.
Now, for Lewis, a reductive correlation is the only kind worth
having -- so, anyway, it is usually assumed, and given that the
correlation he defends is the most reductive available, there seems little
reason to doubt it.  But the fact is that one can read quite a way into
Lewis's bookwithout reductiveness coming up as an explicit
desideratum.52   Most of the time it sounds as though the reason for
believing in his "concrete correlation" (13) is that it exemplifies better
than any competing correlation the values expressed above, such as
comprehensiveness and theoretical power.53 That the correlation is
reductive besides appears to be just gravy, except to the extent that it
helps with the other desiderata.
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Starting about halfway through the book, however, we find Lewis
objecting to certain ersatzist alternatives to (13) that they smuggle
modal notions in on the right-hand side. Apparently, then, reductiveness
is something that Lewis is prepared to insist on. Why?  Is it because he
takes the same view of modality that Jerry Fodor does of intentionality,
viz., that if it is really real, it must really be something else?  I doubt it.
No one could be less sentimental than he about the tradeoffs
philosophers are occasionally forced to make between ideology and
ontology.  If the price were right, he would be as willing as anyone to
buy relief from unwelcome entities by taking on a primitive notion or
two.54 It's just that in this case, the price is not right; in fact, the
tradeoffs play out the other way.55 A reductive account of modality is so
enormously valuable as to more than compensate us for the humongous
ontology of worlds.
All right, but now we need a distinction. Is it that a reductive
account of modality is so intrinsically valuable as to compensate us etc.?
This is hard to take seriously.  Faced with a no-strings-attached decision
between the humongous ontology of concrete worlds, on the one hand,
and letting possibility be what it is and not another thing, on the other,
most of us would know which way to jump.
So the claim has got to be that a reductive analysis of modality is
so extrinsically valuable as to compensate us, etc. -- that is, so valuable
from the point of view of desiderata other than reductiveness. And now
we are back where we started: if the concrete correlation is better, that is
not because it is nonreductive per se but because it outperforms the
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competition in other respects.  Whereupon we're entitled to ask why a
nonreductive correlation like (11) couldn't do just as well.   
Or indeed better. Because if a correlation is going to do theoretical
work,  it's very important that it be there, that it be comprehensive, and
that it not be itself unduly mysterious.  And between (11) and Lewis's
(13), the verdict is clear.  (11) is bordering on analytic, which is about as
good as you can do in the truth and comprehensiveness and
unmysteriousness departments.  Whereas (13), on top of being prima
facie as improbable as anything ever was, is baffling even on the
supposition of its truth.  If an oracle convinced us that ours was one of a
large number of spatiotemporally isolated universes, each enacting
modal facts about the others while they all the while returned the favor,
this would be regarded as the most amazing coincidence on record.56
XI I
Now, the natural and proper reply to this is that Lewis's concrete
correlation, its existence momentarily granted,  so thoroughly creams
the competition at dispelling modal mysteries that we should take it on
board however prima facie improbable and however baffling if true.
(13) has been undersold, in other words.  This is something we'll get to
in a moment; let us consider first a way in which (11) has been oversold.
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Again and again (11) has been billed as close to a conceptual truth,
or bordering on analytic. Why the hedge,  if (11') and (11") are
conceptual truth and (11) is their conjunction?   The hedge is because
(11) is not their conjunction; it is slightly but crucially stronger.   This
comes out if we compare what (11) tells on the supposition that S is
possible with what (11") tells us on the same supposition.  According to
(11), "how is S possible?" has a correct answer.   But (11") only as it were
exhibits this answer,57 without testifying to its existence.  ((11") does
perhaps tell us that "how is S possible?" is correctly answerable, in some
appropriate sense of that word.  But answerability is one thing, having a
correct answer another.58)  The upshot is that (11) is a conceptual truth
only modulo the existence of answers with the requisite contents.  And
that is a very big modulo.  It begins to appear that, although on friendly
terms with conceptual truths, (11) is not itself actually even true.59
 Not good.  And we have yet to consider the other reply, namely,
that (13) is needed regardless of (11)'s truth value on account of its
greater effectiveness against modal mysteries.  Take again the "mystery"
of the laws of modality, using
    (14) if ◊S and     T then ◊(S&T)
as a typical instance.  Why is it that counterexamples to this never turn
up?   (13) has an explanation to offer: If S is possible, then there is an S-
world, call it W.  W cannot be a not-T world, since there aren't any; so,
worlds being complete, it must be a T-world. W is accordingly an S&T-
world, which means that possibly S&T.  Now try the same thing using
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(11). Since S is possible, "how is S possible?" has a correct answer A.  A is
clearly not an answer to "how is not-T possible?,"  for T is necessary. But
this still doesn't give us an answer to "how is S&T possible?," for A may
well be silent on the subject of T.
Examples could be multiplied. (13) has a real analytic advantage
for the simple reason that worlds are complete while answers to "how is
that possible?" questions tend to leave a great deal undecided.
Someone might reply that possible world semantics can just as
easily be done in terms of "partial" worlds60 conceived as subject to a
refinability condition: given any T you like,
 (15) any partial world at which S is true has a refinement at which S is true and T
is true or else one at which S is true and T is false.61
And this condition is very much in the spirit of (11)'s portrayal of
possibility as expansive:  S is possible only if it is possible together with
T or possible together with not-T.
The fact is, however, that (15) adds something to expansiveness
that is necessary for serious modal mathematics; it says not merely that
S is possible only if its conjunction with T, or with not-T, is possible, but
that any witness to S's possibility can be refined into a witness to the
possibility of one of these conjunctions. If a version of this held for
answers -- if we could be assured that
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 (16) any correct answer to H◊S? has a refinement that correctly answers
H◊(S&T)? or else one that correctly answers H◊(S&¬T)?  
-- then the analytic gap between (11) and (13) would be significantly
narrowed.62   But unless we have it in mind to shoot ourselves in the foot
by indulging at this late date in wishful platonic thinking,  (16) is not
something we can afford to assume. The only answers we can safely rely
on in this context are the ones that have actually cropped up in
conversations or on paper. And these, it seems clear, are not closed
under refinement; time being short and attention limited, they
eventually peter out.
XIII
People have not in fact gotten around to giving all the answers our
approach needs.  But having come this far, it seems a shame to retreat
before so drearily medical a difficulty.  It seems to me that we don't
have to.  The insight that (11) is struggling to express is that S is possible
iff it is possible somehow.  And we know from section IX that if
"somehow" is to be understood in terms of quantification over answers,
that quantification will itself have to be understood as feigned or
conducted in a spirit of make-believe.
The outlines of a suitable make-believe can be gleaned from the
last section.  One crucial idea is that whenever "how is S possible?" is
answerable (it is possible that S+), a correct answer to it actually exists.63
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Another is that any correct answer to "how is S possible?" has a
refinement that either affirms T or denies it.    If we let these two ideas
together be called the refinable-answer story, or RAS, then all that
remains is to put the quantifier on (11)'s right-hand side under the care
of an "according to RAS" operator.  The biconditional
  (17) ◊S iff according to RAS, H◊S? has a correct answer                           
that results is a conceptual truth that enables free back-and-forth
motion between possibility, on the one hand, and existential
quantification over a single matrix of as-determinate-as-you-need
witnesses on the other.  To the extent that (12) and (13) have their
analytic power as catalysts in this sort of transition, (17) can offer the
same power at a fraction of the ontological cost.64
All right, but why stop there?   If we are willing to stipulate that
incomplete answers are partly refinable, why not go whole hog and
make them completely refinable?   The determinate-answer story is just
like the refinable-answer story, except that correct answers to "how
possible?" questions are always refinable into correct answers leaving
nothing unsettled.  This gives us a still closer approximation to the
standard analysis:65
    (18) ◊S iff according to DAS, H◊S? has a determinate correct answer.
And now for a final weird twist. "Answer" is a theoretical notion whose
proper treatment is to some extent up for grabs.  No doubt answers are
- 39 -
often best seen as representations.  ("Here is your answer" I say: "your
cousin Giorgio.")  Sometimes though it is the thing represented that
seems better suited to the role. ("There is your answer," I say, with a nod
at your approaching cousin.)  So far we have been taking the first
approach; more or less determinate answers to "how is S possible?" have
been more or less comprehensive representations according to which S.
But once having made the switch to fully determinate answers, and
pretended ones at that, the second option becomes suddenly attractive.
You want to know how blue swans are possible, in full and
comprehensive detail?  There is your answer, I say, gesturing or
pretending to gesture, to the best of my expressive abilities, at a
concrete I-and-all-my-surroundings world wherein swans really are
blue.66
Reconceive determinate answers like this and the determinate-answer
story becomes the many-worlds story: S is possible only if "how is S
possible?" has an answer taking the form of a concrete world at which S
is true.  And (18) becomes
     (19) ◊S iff according to MWS, there is a concrete world at which S.
You might think that Lewis would welcome (19) with open arms; isn't
the many-worlds story his story?  It is not.67  Both stories tell of an array
of concrete worlds. But Lewis's story portrays these worlds as
independently constituted, not inherently modal entities which
somehow nevertheless contrive to constitute the ground of modal truth.
The present story conjures worlds up from within the structure of
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possibility itself -- from what we called its expansive quality.  Worlds are
the ideal objects of our efforts to give more and more specific answers to
the question "how could that be?"   This is how we can know that (19) is
true, that S is possible iff according to the story there is an S-world.68
XIV
Twenty or thirty years ago, before the campaign to make modal
metaphysics honest had gotten seriously under way, the talk was less of
worlds than of something called the world metaphor.   Lewis's Quinean
scrupulosity about ontological commitment was one reason this sort of
talk fell out of favor.   (Fish or cut bait, Lewis said, it's up to you, but this
hanging around on the dock telling fish stories has got to stop.)  Another
reason however was that it was never clear what the talk meant.  One
saw, of course, what worlds qua metaphors were supposed to do: shed
metaphysical light "from beyond the grave," simply by making
themselves available to theoretical contemplation.69  But it was never
quite explained what they were that this was within their powers.
All the same, it seems to me that the pre-Lewis approach to these
matters was onto something.  Talk about worlds is metaphorical, or close
enough not to matter.  Some of the argument for this is already in place:
world-talk as it features in (19)  is fictional and so the sort of thing we
are to pretend or imagine is true.  The next step is to observe that the
pretense is in a quite particular spirit, a spirit characteristic of
metaphor.
- 41 -
*******
Almost wherever there is disciplined pretense or imagination,
there is something that can be considered a game of make-believe.70
Some of these games, e.g., those growing up around explicit texts or
other art objects, can claim official sanction.  But others are brought into
being by ad hoc informal arrangements ("mud pies, anyone?") or the
understanding of a moment ("I've fallen and I can't get up!!").  And
others yet are based on nothing at all, arising among like-minded
pretenders of their own accord. (Finding ourselves in an unexpectedly
swanky hotel room,  we begin putting on airs and acting the part.)
What links all make-believe games together is that they call on their
participants to pretend or imagine that certain things are the case.
These "to be imagined" items make up the game's content,  and to
elaborate and pretensively adapt oneself to this content is generally the
game's very point.71
Not always though.  An alternative point suggests itself as soon as
we realize that all but the most boring make-believe games are played
with props, whose game-independent properties help to determine what
it is that the players are to imagine or pretend.  Nowhere in the rules of
mudpies does it say that Sam's pie is too big for the oven;  if this is to be
imagined, the reason is that Sam's clump of mud doesn't fit into the
hollow stump.   (Here the props are Sam's clump of mud and the stump.)
Nowhere in the rules of the Holmes-game does it say that Holmes lives
nearer to Hyde Park than to Central Park;  if this is fictionally the case,
the facts of 19th century geography deserve part of the credit.72  (Here
the prop is a sizable chunk of the Earth's surface.)
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If a game's content reflects in part the properties of the props,
then the game itself can be conceived in two quite different lights.  What
normally happens is that we take an interest in the props because and to
the extent that they influence the game's content; we tramp around
London in search of 221B Baker street for the light it may shed on what
is true according to the Holmes stories.   But in principle it could be the
other way around; we could be interested in a game's content because
and to the extent that it informed us about the props.   This would not
stop us from playing the game, necessarily, but it would tend to confer a
different significance on our moves.  Pretending within the game to
assert that BLAH would be a way of giving voice to a fact holding outside
the game: the fact that the props are in such a condition as to make
BLAH a proper thing to pretend to assert.   One can even imagine there
being advantages to this style of expression -- up to and including that
of being the only way open to us of putting the relevant fact into words.
Using games to talk about game-independent reality makes a
certain in principle sense, then.  But is such a thing ever actually done?
A case can be made that it is done all the time, not indeed with explicit
self-identified games like "mudpies" but impromptu everyday games
hardly rising to the level of consciousness.   Consider some examples of
Ken Walton's:
Where in Italy is the town of Crotone? I ask. You explain that it is on the arch
of the Italian boot. 'See that thundercloud over there -- the big, angry face
near the horizon,' you say; 'it is headed this way.'...We speak of the saddle of a
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mountain and the shoulder of a highway....All of these cases are linked to
make-believe. We think of Italy and the thundercloud as something like
pictures. Italy (or a map of Italy) depicts a boot. The cloud is a prop which
makes it fictional that there is an angry face...The saddle of a mountain is,
fictionally, a horse's saddle.  But our interest, in these instances, is not in the
make-believe itself, and it is not for the sake of games of make-believe that
we regard these things as props...[The make-believe] is useful for
articulating, remembering, and communicating facts about the props --
about the geography of Italy, or the identity of the storm cloud...or mountain
topography.  It is by thinking of Italy or the thundercloud...as potential if
not actual props that I understand where Crotone is, which cloud is the one
being talked about.73
Make-believe games,  Walton says, can be "useful for articulating,
remembering, and communicating facts about [their] props."  He might
have added that they can make it easier to reason about such facts, to
systematize them, to visualize them,  to spot connections with other
facts,  and to evaluate potential lines of research.  That similar virtues
have been claimed for metaphors is no accident, for here is a tempting
account of how metaphor works:
The metaphorical statement (in its context) implies or suggests or introduces
or calls to mind a (possible) game of make-believe.  The utterance may be an
act of verbal participation in the implied game, or it may be merely the
utterance of a sentence that could be used in participating in the game.  In           
saying what she does, the speaker describes things that are or would be
props in the implied game. [To the extent that paraphrase is possible] the
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paraphrase will specify features of the props by virtue of which it would be
fictional in the implied game that the speaker speaks truly, if her utterance
is an act of verbal participation in it.74
A metaphor, in brief, is an utterance U portraying its subject as of a kind
to make U pretense-worthy in a game that U itself suggests.  The game is
played (or invoked) not for its own sake but to make clear which game-
independent properties are being attributed: they are the ones that do
or would confer legitimacy upon the utterance construed as a move in
the game.
Utterances about possible worlds appear to fit the bill pretty
exactly.  "There are worlds in which blue swans exist" suggests a game in
which we pretend that all and only the things that could happen in this
world do happen in some world or other.  The point of the utterance is
to say that the modal facts are such as to make "there are blue swan
worlds" pretense-worthy in the game --  to say, in other words, that blue
swans could have existed.  Even if the tradition did not know quite what
it meant in calling worlds metaphors, that is what they appear to be.75
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1 Compare Benacerraf, "Mathematical Truth."  See also Katz, "What
Mathematical Knowledge Could Be."
2 Compare Etchemendy, The Concept of Logical Consequence.
3 Lewis, "Possible Worlds," p. 182.
4 Lewis, "Possible Worlds," p. 184.
5 Stalnaker, "Possible Worlds," p. 228.
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6 Otherwise it would seem that blue swans,  although they would
have been possible had things been different, are not possible as
matters stand.
7 Ibid, p. 228. Identity statements are reversible; if A = B, then B = A
as well. To say that the way the world is is the world, however,
sounds wrong.  (Except maybe to those who believe with
Wittgenstein that the world is all that is the case.  Even to them
though it won't sound truistic,  as the world is the way it is does --
and it should, if it too is an identity statement.)
8 Someone might say that the same word or phrase can play both
roles depending on grammatical context;  "red" functions as an
adjective in "the book is red," a noun in "red is a color."  I am not
sure what to say about this but one possibility is that there are two
words here with the same spelling.  (Why color-nouns in particular
should be so often orthographically indiscernible from their
corresponding adjectives  is unclear to me;  compare "triangle is a
shape," or "tiny is a size.")   Another example, suggested by Niko
Scharer,  is this: "the color it is" functions as an adjective in "the
book is the color it is", a noun in "the color it is is a dark color."
Again it seems possible that we have two distinct phrases here with
the same orthography.  The second is a definite description, the first
a concealed question, like "his age" in "I know his age."
9 Or perhaps of composition, as in "that clay you sold me is now a
statue of Goliath."  But that is not a likely reading here.
10 One idea is that "the way it is" is a proadjective or proadverb
along the lines of "thus" or "thusly." This would provide no reading
- 50 -
                                                                                                            
of Stalnaker's statement that "the way the world is is a property of
the world." But Stalnaker exegesis aside, the proform idea seems
worth pursuing.  Eventually a theory of proadjectival or
proadverbial quantification would be needed, for we have sentences
like "whatever way things had been, they would have been such and
so" to deal with.  There is in fact a neglected literature on this, some
of it inspired by the work of Lesniewski; see for example Prior's
Objects of Thought, Kung's "Meaning of the Quantifiers in
Lesniewski," and Simons's "Semantics for Ontology."  Also relevant is
the program laid out in Grover,  "Propositional Quantifiers," and
Grover, Camp, and Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth." Both
articles are reprinted in Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Truth.
11 The way you smile so bright, the way you knock me off my feet,
etc. This is to say nothing of "Fifty Ways to Leave Your Lover."
12 I am told that cockatoos don't build nests;  but say they do.
13 Exercise:  Compare and contrast (i) "how S"/"the way that S," (ii)
"why S"/"the reason that S," (iii) "whether S"/"the truth value of S,"
(iv) "which S"/"the S's identity," and (v) "how many Ss"/ "the
number of Ss."  (Some remarks of Ian Rumfitt's about (iii)  were
what  got me thinking about (i).)
14 The issue is complicated by the distinction between indirect
questions and free relative clauses.  The distinction is not always
well marked in English but there are some clear cases. "What you
think" is a free relative in "I think what you think," an indirect
question in "I wonder what you think."  Sometimes context does not
resolve the ambiguity: "what you know" is a free relative in "I know
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what you know" interpreted as "whatever you know, I know," an
indirect question in the same sentence interpreted as "whatever you
know, I know you know."
15 I don't mean to disparage this kind of approach;   it can be
wonderfully illuminating.  See Groenendijk & Stokhof 1989.
16 Or are the initial phrases in (3) free relatives?  Here are some
reasons to think not.  (A)  Free relatives are interrogated with the
relative pronouns they embed -- "I once had a drink where Elvis was
born"/"you once had a drink where?" --  whereas indirect questions
are interrogated with "what?" --  "I wonder where Elvis was
born"/"you wonder what?."  And in response to (e.g.) "March 31 is
when the swallows return" we say not "*March 31 is when?" but
"March 31 is what?."  (B) Interrogative pronouns take strong stress in
a way that relative pronouns do not; "I know WHERE Elvis was born --
only not WHEN" but "*I had a drink WHERE Elvis was born -- only not
WHEN."  And we have no problem with "WHO invited them is Becky,
WHEN I have no idea."  Third, plural relatives in subject position take
the plural form of the verb -- "what Shakespeare regarded as his best
plays are nowadays seldom read" -- whereas indirect questions take
the singular form -- "what Shakespeare regarded as his best plays is
anybody's guess."  And we say "what the coach forgot is the keys, the
map,  etc." not "*what the coach forgot are the keys, the map, etc."
Finally, free relatives according to most authors can only be
introduced by "what," when," or "where."  But the construction in (3)
works for all wh-words other than "whether."  (I am indebted to
Baker's Indirect Questions in English.)
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17 Not that all indirect-question-embedding statements with main
verb "is" have the atmosphere of an identity statement.  Some feel
downright predicative, for instance,  "she is how I used to be" and
"the world is how it is."   A good theory of indirect questions ought
to have something to say about this.
18 Admittedly, the salva congruitate test has its limits; "sunny
Madrid is a favorite of ours" sounds good, "*sunny the capital of
Spain etc." doesn't.  Examples can also be given however where it is
truth-value that changes.
19 I have taken some liberties.
20 As always, I am talking about ordinary commonsensical reference,
not reference to higher-type objects as in Montague grammar; "who
invited them" refers to the one who invited them if it refers at all.
21  "Offering information about Q's answer(s)" is not to be thought
of as involving reference to or quantification over answers, or
acceptance of answers into one's ontology.   I can give information
about an answer by simply providing it, e.g., by saying "she's going
to Albuquerque."  (This fits nicely with Alasdair MacIntyre's
suggestion that  "where she's going is Albuquerque" is a piece of
play-acting in which I set myself a question and then respond.)
22 Both kinds of flexibility will be important later on, when we get to
questions like "how is that possible?"  --  the first because this  might
have any number of correct answers, the second because its answers
might be understood either as world-representations or as the
worlds themselves.
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23 Wherever convenient the distinction between AQ and its members
will be blurred -- so that A"what is 2 plus 3?," although strictly
speaking {"5"} or {5}, is in practice "5" or 5.
24 Or perhaps it is the meanings of these phrases that constitute the
answers; this is one of the issues we're leaving open.  Note that the
identity feeling wanes as the material after the "is" goes from
providing the answer to merely constraining it to merely
commenting on it;  thus "who invited them is Becky," "who invited
them is someone with a strange sense of humor," "who invited them
is no one you want to know," "who invited them is classified
information," "who invited them is a mystery to me."
25 Here again I am slurring the difference between AQs and their
members. Also I assume for convenience that answers are linguistic
in nature; if not, substitute "AQ's linguistic presentation" for "AQ."
26  Jerrold Katz objected that this is circular since AQ might itself be
an indirect question.  One reply is just to stipulate that indirect
question substituends are not allowed.  Another is to say that we
should read (ii) as: AQ is obviously, convincingly, invincibly
referential.  Indirect questions fail this condition,  so we can safely
ignore them.
27 Some what-questions belong here too, e.g., "what the coach
forgot."  But what-questions are incredibly various. Just as often
they resemble how- and why-questions in satisfying (i) but not (ii),
as for example  "what works best is to dip the brush in turpentine."
Where- and when-questions are tricky too.  Prior in Objects of
Thought observes in effect that these often call for prepositional
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answers rather than nominal ones: "in Paris," "to Albuquerque," "on
March 31," and so on.  That leaves only indirect who-questions as
clearly apparently referential.
28 Strictly, the answers to the direct counterparts of their embedded
questions.
29 This section has borrowed freely from the literature on questions,
including Kartunnen 1977, Engdahl 1986, and Higginbotham 1993 .
30 Phrases like "whys and wherefores"  perhaps reflect some long-
ago attempt to go plural while remaining interrogative.  Even "hows
and whys" is not unheard of.  Consider this from Webster's 3rd New
International Dictionary:  "most of the film is devoted to the grim
hows and not the difficult whys of battle."
31 Quine, "On What There Is."
32 There is a cartoon about the last worker on the Sara Lee assembly
line;  she sits by the conveyor belt asking herself of each passing pie,
"Would I be proud to serve this to my family?."  Replace the pies
with noun phrases and you have Quine's picture of the traditional
ontologist:  "Am I content to think that this refers to a bona fide
entity?"
33 Lewis, "Plurality of Worlds,"  p. 3.
34 Ibid,  p. 3.
35 This objection might be answerable for a particular S if we had an
inventory of all the ways things could have been which afforded S any
chance at possibility:  say, the way they would have been if A1, the way
they would have been if A2, ..., and so on. For then we could  say that S
is possible
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iff  there's a way things could have been such that S
iff  S is how things would have been if A1, or
      S is how things would have been if A2, or...
iff   S figures in the answer to "how would things have been if A1?" or 
       S figures in the answer to "how would things have been if A2?" or...
(Or, we could drop questions altogether and say simply that S is
possible iff it would have been that S had it been that A1, or it
would have been that S had it been that A2, or ...)  I take it though
that this kind of inventory is not to be had.   The best we can do is:
S is possible iff there is some way things could have been such that
S.
36 See Prior,  Objects of Thought, pp. 34ff.
37 For some reason this sounds better in old English: "however
valium worketh, so also worketh librium."
38 Compare the modalist project of trying to approximate the
expressive power of direct quantification over worlds by means of
indexed actuality operators and the like.  See Fine, "Postscript," and
Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality,  pp. 89ff.
39 Words like "way" and "reason" testify to this;  they are there to
permit the introduction of objectual methods.  We embrace them
eagerly unbothered by the fact that there are no such things as the
way the wolf blew the house down (by huffing and puffing) or the
reason the chicken crossed the road (to get to the other side.)
("grasshopper, you have much to learn." "unless there are
countermodels an argument is called valid")
40 This is not to forget the occasional brave soul who offers to give
the semantics of, say, tense or adverbs in a tensed or adverbial
metalanguage.  The brave soul in a way proves my point; because
the feeling is bound to be that she is an obscurantist who for some
reason refuses to dig down below the level of idiom  --  or, if there is
no deeper (more objectual) story to be had,  that the construction
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itself is idiomatic in the pejorative sense of being more familiar than
clear.
41 What exactly the pretense is is another matter.  These answers
might be seen as linguistic in nature, in which case it will be part of
the story that enough of them exist: that every answerable question
actually receives an answer.  If answers are seen instead as what
linguistic "answers" stand for,  it will also have to be pretended that
phrases like "by huffing and puffing" refer to items in the world.  One
possible account of ways is that they are the things we pretend to
refer to by use of phrases like "by huffing and puffing," when we
pretend that these phrases are referential.   But I do not mean to
commit myself to this and in fact we are getting way ahead of
ourselves.
42 All right, but what is the nature of the pretense?   That will
depend in part on whether answers are seen as linguistic items or as
what linguistic "answers" stand for.
43 If the first, then it will be part of the story that enough of them
exist;  that a question never goes unanswered just because no one
happen to put, say, "by huffing and puffing" into words.  If the
second, it may have to be pretended as well that the phrases that
qualify as linguistic answers are of the right type to refer, and that
they refer in fact.  (One tempting account of ways is that they are
the things we pretend to refer to by use of phrases like "by huffing
and puffing," when we pretend that these phrases are referential.)
The simplest sort of make-believe will do no more than just expand
the membership of an established category: the category of
linguistic expressions.  Another however would would constitute a
new category,  say, a category of entities for adverbial modifiers to
stand for.  (How about this as a theory of ways: they are the things
that we pretend to refer to with phrases like "by huffing and
puffing," when we pretend that such phrases are referential.)
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44 Of course, the answer has to be correct.  Someone might say that
worlds reinsert themselves just here, when we try to explain what
correctness comes to.  But why does the explanation have to be in
terms of what does or does not exist, as opposed to what is or is not
possible?   Suppose that an answer to "how is S possible?" takes the
form "S+ is possible," where S+ is presented as sufficing for S.  Then
the main thing correctness requires is that S+ is possible and does
suffice for S.   How the correctness of these claims are to be
understood is another question.   Some may opt for homophonic
correctness-conditions, or Piercean ones;  others may insist on
something more substantive,  up to and including, I suppose,
conditions framed in terms of possible worlds.  That these various
options continue to be available is in a way the point.  The worldly
semantics is presented as an offer we cannot refuse;  that cannot be
right, if the same analytic advantages are available to those
choosing another semantics,  and indeed to those leaving the
semantical choice unmade.  (Here and elsewhere I slur the
sometimes-important distinction between possible worlds semantics
and the possible worlds analysis of modality.)
45 Sufficing might be a matter of metaphysical necessitation.  Then
(11') is the modal-logical truth that anything necessitated by a
possibility is itself possible. Or it might be a subjunctive affair; if S+
were the case, S would be the case as well.  Again, from this and the
fact that S+ is possible, S's possibility logically follows.  Of course,
(11') continues to be a logical truth on stronger readings of
- 58 -
                                                                                                            
sufficing, e.g.,  S+ necessitates S and understandably so, or it is a
priori that S would be the case if S+ were the case.
46  It might be objected that "possibly, S&T" does not have the right
form for an answer to "how is S possible?"  The questioner wants to
know (not what could have been the case together with S but) what
could have been the case to bring it about that S.  This assumes that
the "how" in "how is S possible?" has got to be one of means rather
than manner.  "Possibly S&T" answers "how is S possible?" in much
the same way as "they fit stacked together like so" answers "how do
all those dominoes fit into that little box?"  The emphasis on manner
is only natural inasmuch as doubts about "S is possible" tend to
derive less from the (suspected) absence of a positive basis for S's
possibility -- some possibilities are surd after all -- than the
(suspected) presence of a positive obstacle to its possibility.  This
suspicion usually takes the form indicated in the text: seemingly
coherent scenarios according to which S have a way of falling apart
when one attempts to flesh them out so as to render a verdict about
T.  Yablo 1993 has more on this theme.
47 Subject to the usual qualifications about semantical paradox.
48 Otherwise one could say: it's perfectly possible to have a barber
who shaves all and only the non-self-shavers, what's impossible is
that along with a resolution of who if anyone shaves the barber.
49 I leave (12) aside for now since Lewis has questioned its claim to
be called reductive.
50 Further circularities creep in later, when (11) gives way to (17).
51 Lewis, Plurality of Worlds,  17,  italics added.
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52 It does come up in passing, for instance in the passage just
quoted.
53 So, Lewis objects to linguistic ersatzism that it misclassifies "alien"
possibilities as impossible, and to magical ersatzism that it
postulates a mysterious making-true relation.  Lewis's own favored
correlation has been charged with falsely "predicting" the
impossibility of island universes, a charge he takes dead seriously.
54 "I conclude that linguistic ersatzism must indeed take modality as
primitive. If its entire point were to afford an analysis of modality,
that would be a fatal objection. But there are many theoretical
services left for a version of ersatzism to render, even if it cannot
analyze modality away. So it is open to an ersatzer to pay the price,
accept modality as primitive, and consider the proposal well worth
it on balance. Many ersatzers...see the contest between genuine and
ersatz modal realism in just that way: there is a choice between
unwelcome ontology and unwelcome primitive modality, and they
prefer the latter. That seems to me a fair response on their part, but
of course not conclusive" (Plurality of Worlds, 156).
55 "If our work is directed to ontological questions only, we may help
ourselves to any primitives we please, so long as we somehow
understand them. But if our work is directed to ontological and
analytic questions both, ...then we are trying at once to cut down on
questionable ontology and to cut down on primitives; and it is fair
to object if one goal is served at too much cost to the other" (ibid,
157).
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56  Comprehensiveness may be a problem too, since (13) as  Lewis
understands it rules out the possibility of spatiotemporally
unrelated ("island") universes.  Far from hushing this problem up,
Lewis has done a good deal to publicize it:
The intuitive case that island universes are possible has been
much strengthened by a recent argument in John Bigelow and
Robert Pargetter, "Beyond the Blank Stare"....First, mightn't
there be a world of almost isolated island universes, linked
only by a few short-lived wormholes?  And mightn't the
presence of the wormholes depend on what happens in the
islands?  And then wouldn't it be true that if the goings-on in
the islands had been just a little different, there wouldn't have
been any wormholes?  Then wouldn't there have been a world
of altogether isolated islands?" (Lewis, "Review of Armstrong,"
p. 223).
His rejection of island universes puts Lewis in the superficially
awkward position of maintaining that there is something -- the
mereological sum of all the various worlds -- such that a thing like
that cannot be.   But reject them he must if he wants to hold on to
his definition of worlds as maximal spatiotemporally connected
objects.  A lot is riding on this definition here since all the
alternatives that come to mind are explicitly or implicitly modal.
Allow island universes and it is not clear whether (13) can still be
regarded as a reduction.  (See Plurality of Worlds, pp. 69ff.)
57 And this only schematically.
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58  One could attempt to deny the distinction, maintaining that Q is
correctly answerable iff it has a correct answer iff there is a fact of
the matter as to IQ.  There is certainly something to be said for this
view.   "'What would China do if the US recognized Taiwan?' has an
answer" does not intuitively make an existence claim; it says that
there is a fact of the matter as to what China would do.   By the
same token, when (11) assures us that "how is S possible?" has an
answer, this means only that there is a fact of the matter as to how S
is possible.  And (11") gives us the same assurance, when it tells us
that S is possible either T-ishly, or (failing that) not-T-ishly.   Now
though we have to decide whether "there is a fact of the matter as to
...." involves genuine quantification over facts.  If it does, we lose;
the cause of ontology-free theoretical power is hardly served by
trading one ontology for another. If it doesn't, we lose again; give up
the quantification and the theoretical power goes too
59 Another option is to read "there is an answer" in (11) as "there
could have been an answer, such and such conditions holding
fixed." (Similarly one could read "there is a world" in (12) and (13)
as "there could have been a world"  --  a type of quantifier discussed
in Fine, "Postscript.")   I will be taking a different line but this one
strikes me as also worth pursuing.
60 Sometimes called "situations" or "possibilities."
61 Cf. Humberstone, "From Worlds to Possibilities," and Forbes,
Metaphysics of Modality, pp. 18-22 and 43-47.  True refinability is a
more complicated affair than (15) suggests, but the differences are
not important here.
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62 For example, we could explain (14) by saying that any answer to
"how is S possible?" is refinable into an answer to "how is S&T
possible?," since given T's necessity "how is S&¬T possible?" is
unanswerable.
63 As discussed above, S+ should suffice for S.  There might be
"pragmatic" conditions on S+ as well; it should speak to the
questioner's doubts.  (11") guarantees that "how is S possible?" is
correctly answerable in a way that addresses these doubts whatever
they may be,  provided that S is indeed possible.
64 Compare Rosen's "Modal Fictionalism."  This paper can be seen as
one possible development of Rosen's next to last paragraph:
Throughout I have supposed that fictionalism, like modal
realism, aims to be a theory of possibility...But note that this
assumption is not strictly necessary given the modest problem
we began with. All Ed ever wanted was license to move back
and forth between modal claims and claims about worlds...it is
one thing to embrace these biconditionals -- even to embrace
them as a body of necessary truths -- and another to regard
them as providing analyses...This timid fictionalism of course
raises as many questions as it answers. Still it must be granted
that many of the objections we have mentioned...simply do
not arise for this view (233-234).
65 Albeit to the version (12) that quantifies over abstract
representations of concrete worlds rather than the worlds
themselves
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66 Sentential/propositional answers to "how is S possible?" still exist
on this view, but they interest us mainly as presentations of the
fully determinate answers that we call concrete worlds.
67 For the same reasons, it is not Gideon Rosen's story in "Modal
Fictionalism" either.
68 Someone might think that MWS was lacking in substantiave
content. But a story's content is not exhausted by what is explicitly
written down (see the next section).  If S is possible, then according
to MWS, there is a world in which S.   Since blue swans are possible,
according to MWS there is a world at which blue swans exist; since
they are possible together with a German victory in the First World
War, according to MWS there is a world like that as well.  How claims
like this make their way into the content of Lewis's story (as
elaborated by Rosen) is a nontrivial question; see Rosen, pp. 227-8.
69 See the epigraph.
70 "Almost" because the pretense has to be disciplined in the right
way.  I'm not sure what the right way is but at least this much is
true.  There is no make-believe game if imaginings are forbidden
but none are prescribed (Albanians under Hoxha were told not to
imagine life in the West) or if they are prescribed but on a basis
having not enough to do with what they are imaginings of  (as in a
biofeedback game where contestants try to raise their heartrates just
by the exercise of their imaginations).
71 Better, such and such is part of the game's content if "it is to be
imagined .... should the question arise, it being understood that
often the question shouldn't arise" (Walton, Mimesis & Make-
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Believe, p. 40).  Subject to the usual qualifications,  the ideas about
make-believe and metaphor in this and the next few paragraphs are
all due to Walton.  See his "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-
Believe."
72 The example is adapted from Lewis, "Truth in Fiction."
73  Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," pp. 40-1.
74  Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," p. 46.  (I
should say that Walton does not propose this as a general theory of
metaphor.)   I am intrigued by Walton's suggestion that
unparaphrasable metaphors  "may still amount to descriptions of
their (potential) props" (p. 46).   If Walton is right, then it becomes
possible to see how, even if modal reality has nothing to do with
worlds, there could still be modal truths requiring quantification
over worlds for their expression.  The point generalizes.
Ineliminable quantification over BLAHs argues that BLAHs exist only
if the quantification is not metaphorical, a notoriously difficult
thing to judge.  This throws the whole project of Quinean ontology
into considerable doubt, and breathes new life into Carnap's
position that not all existence-questions have a "right answer."
75 Some of the many additional topics that need attention are:
iterated modalities, transworld identity, grades of modality,
impossible worlds,  and (especially) modal epistemology.
